INTRODUCTION
The theme of the magic circle is central to the theme of games in general and digital games, in particular, among other things, because it helps us think about the concept of game and its extensions in everyday life. Similarly, the concept of liminality can be a light to understanding online and offline life, as well as the idea of transitional phenomenon can be useful for a better understanding of the game experience. To discuss these issues, we will gradually bring in the concepts and weave their points of relationship. In the research on digital games, the theme of the magic circle is referenced in a paragraph in the beginning of Huizinga's still necessary book Homo Ludens.
Presented in the book Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004) , the concept, in that context, was also influenced by the works of Apter and Sniderman, according to Stenros (2012) . Moreover, Zimmerman himself, in a text of 2012 in the Gamasutra gaming website, stated that the concept of magic circle was more or less invented by him and Salen for the book, from Huizinga (1938) and Callois (1958) 14 , but reformulated in terms of design and semiotics.
Understood, since then, by games scholars as a metaphor, the term "magic circle" has suffered a number of criticisms in recent years. Stenros (2012) , for instance, starting from the ideas of Calleja, understands that Huizinga uses the term not only as a metaphor, but as a key feature of the examples of games that he mentions in Homo Ludens.
Aiming at a more rigorous analysis to deal with this issue, Stenros proposes in the same article a reading of the topic from other different perspectives. For some authors mentioned in the book, the concept is understood from the player's personal mentality (psychological bubble of play), for others the concept stands as a signed social contract that creates a game. In a third approach, the magic circle is understood as the arena based on space, time or product on which play takes place.
We will try to discuss different perspectives well discussed by Stenros (2012) , that relate the social perspective with classical authors of Anthropology (Van Gennep 1909 , Turner, 1974 and the personal approach of the player with the concept of transitional phenomenon wrought by Winnicott (1975) in 1951 and by a socio-anthropological reflection of Da Matta (2000).
THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A QUESTIONER OF THE BOUNDARIES OF PLAY
The expression magic circle appears in six different contexts in the Brazilian Portuguese translation of the book Homo Ludens, and this was also found by Finnish author Stenros (2012) in the English version. As the latter points out, only three of the quotes are brought by games scholars when dealing with the theme: as (1) a material or ideally marked place, (2) as a metaphor, or (3) as sacred space (as opposed to the play space). As this is the original source of debate around the theme of game studies, we surveyed the expression in Huizinga's book.
In reviewing the occurrence of the expression, we find that the first time that magic circle appears in the text refers to the places in which the game takes place. However, Huizinga warns that these "places" refer to spaces and times of material or imaginary nature (p. 11). In the second occurrence of the expression, the emphasis is on the problem of "breaking the illusion" as disarranging the game itself 15 (p. 12). In the third occurrence it equates the game with the sacred, when he writes that "from a formal point of view, there is no difference between the delimitation of a space for sacred purposes and the same operation for the purpose of simple game" (p. 18). He also discusses (p. 45), the circular shape of the Mahabharata, stating that "the circle as such, however, is of magical significance". Ahead (p. 59), however, he explains that "no matter if it is square or round, in any way it is always a magic circle, an enclosure of play within which the common different categories of men are temporarily abolished" in clear proximity with ritual activities. Later in the end of the book (p.151-152) he reworks the idea of the magic circle, and from there we can draw his conclusion in the form of "cheap metaphor" -as he calls it -"everything is play". With this statement, in the context of the paragraph we believe that he means that the world really is not serious, because we are limited to understanding it only with reason: we're all playing and being played.
From our brief analysis of the occurrence of the concept in Homo Ludens, we can understand why this has generated, and still generates, many comprehension difficulties. Besides being in a field close to the highly complex game concept, we must agree that Huizinga's text is not easy to read for the uninitiated in Philosophy.
From now on we will discuss the different meanings that this concept took, focusing on building a theoretical base for the study of digital games.
When Huizinga uses the term magic circle, it is clear that he does not understand it exclusively as a physical boundary, but also as something that can be marked in ideas, as he states that these can be imaginary places, therefore, not delimited materially. As imaginary places, the concept is used as a metaphor.
However, in other passages, the concept of magic circle is not a metaphor, but the name of one of the locations in which the game takes place. This is evident when he writes (p. 18) "the racetrack, the tennis court, the chessboard or the hopscotch do not distinguish themselves formally from the temple or the magic circle." Well, let us not forget that the magic circle, as a spatially confined place, is the site of the rituals in which something mythical and sacred happens.
In our initial reading of Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004 ) -if not the first, one of the first books that discuss the magic circle in digital games -this was an issue that seems to have demanded a lot of reflection from the authors.
Understanding games (digital or not) as social systems as well as objects that represent social systems (be they real or idealized), in the final chapters they conclude that, depending on the perspective in which the games are perceived, they will be more open or more closed: if the focus is in the rules, tend to be regarded as closed systems, if understood as cultural artifacts, they are open systems. So, for them, the games are nonetheless open and closed systems.
Still, for Salen & Zimmerman, despite the permeability of the magic circle of the game, understood as a cultural object, the game continues to be an artificial object. According to Stenros (2012, p. 2) to the authors of Rules of Play, although the boundaries of the game are fuzzy and permeable, its boundaries are more formal, and "the possible development of play from culture is not relevant." While we consider this criticism to be somewhat too strong, since the authors are dedicated to arguing about the relationship between play and culture, we cannot deny that, as a conclusion, perhaps at the urging of a definitive answer, they say that the games are artificial.
If games are not separated from the rest of culture, are they still really artificial? Yes. Calling games artificial does not mean they are totally distinct from culture. Regardless of how games can be integrated into the culture, there will always be some aspect of the operation of a game that relies on its own system, instead of culture, to create meaning for players. (Salen & Zimmerman, 2012, p.102) In philosophy it is common to find the word "world" (Riezler, 1941 apud Stenros, 2012 Heidegger, 1928; Fink, 1960 In addition to choosing new concepts, we wonder: as play takes up more space in our everyday lives -as it penetrates the rigid structure of the world of work -and the production of genres of pervasive and online games, would it be better understood as a "mundane" therefore no longer artificial and detached from everyday life? We can go a little further into this discussion, pointing out some reflections to help us out of this mess. Fink (1960) had already warned us that when we begin to reflect on play, we realize that we know nothing of what we thought we knew so well. Our previous knowledge appears as a "not-knowing", as something fragile and illusory. As the philosopher indicates, realizing this makes us uneasy, and
THE INTERTWINING OF PLAY AND WORLD
shows an ignorance that causes many people to abandon reflection. For others, the restlessness of "not knowing" triggers the human will for truth. For others still, it triggers the will for philosophy, says Fink.
To him we can speak of two games: the game of the real, which is a phenomenon, and the cosmological game, one that cannot be pointed with a finger, nor be subject to induction, it can only be deduced, as arising from an abduction (Peirce, 2005) . In this argumentative logic, the actual real play would be based on cosmological game, or, as Heidegger (2000) said, games exist because we play and not the opposite.
As a phenomenon, the game is always in the here and now. Thus, we realize the impossibility to access any game with a previous absolute classification.
Remember: a game can only be called as such when someone enters it, that is, when a game is played (Gadamer, 1997) , an issue that we work from several other philosophers (Petry, 2010) . From the perspective of the concept of gameplay, Consalvo (2009) 
THE MAGIC CIRCLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, THE LIMINAL AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE CONTRACT
Having discussed points that conceptually bring the magic circle and play together, as well as having shown how the boundaries between play and nonplay are blurred and almost non-existent for some, for others, in this topic we will discuss the magic circle in a social perspective, relating it to rites as studied in cultural anthropology.
Klasbebers (2006 ( apud Stenros, 2012 while studying the magic circle, understands it as a kind of social contract and the game as a formal artifact of that social contract. In this approach between the magic circle and play, the author says the magic circle relates to the rules and devices that will be triggered when the game starts. For example: before starting any card or board game it is necessary that the players come to an agreement on the rules with which they will play. In digital games, it is part of game design, to have the moments (usually early in the game) for learning the rules and properly using controls or keyboards, an this, in our view, is equivalent to the arrangement of the social contract to start the game.
According to Stenros (2012) , Montola understands the magic circle as a metaphor and a ritualistic contract. For us, Montola's action in bringing the relationship of the magic circle with rituals to discussion on digital games was very timely and his realization that the magic circle works as a contract that prohibits players to bring external motivations and personal stories to the game world and take game events to everyday life, finds resonance in other anthropology authors, as we shall see. In this perspective, the magic circle boundaries would be much more perceivable than some would think.
In order to situate this issue, we will briefly review what rite is and its relationship with play, as well as another key concept for this debate, namely, the concept of liminality.
The relationship between ritual and play appears in classical studies in anthropology, as seen in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss (2005) . To him, a "rite, is also something that is 'played'" (p. 46). In comparison to a game, it seems like a particular and specific kind of game match. That is, the rite begins by exhibiting asymmetric relations between participants, and goes on by leading everyone to move to the side of the "winners", complete the preconceived script of a particular ritual. For Lévi-Strauss, as for the previous philosophers mentioned above who discuss the games (Petry, 2010a; Petry, 2010b) , this is characterized by an openness and "a virtually unlimited number of matches" (p. 46). Although participants begin with equal conditions according to the same rules, in the end, we will have an asymmetric relation between winners and losers. Having in mind this distinction between ritual and play, we can consider that both produce in their participants unique experiences.
Can we say the same about digital games? Do digital games also allow us a virtually unlimited number of matches/experiences? Some would say that they only allow us the experiences programmed by the machine (Liebe & Calleja apud Stenros, 2012) , because they take the game as a closed system in itself.
Others, when they include the player as part of the (open) game (Aarseth, 2003) say that human experience play makes us perceive them as infinite, even making it the reason why we want to play (Petry, 2010a .) Can we still think digital games as a generic category? Or should we define the field in specific games or genres to answer these questions?
We leave these questions open and bring the term liminality into discussion. It refers us to the name of Arnold Van Gennep and to Victor Turner's work, being the latter primarily responsible for the rescue and popularization of the first modern anthropological studies.
In order to describe the transition from a culturally defined state or condition to another, Van Gennep Arnold (2011) 16 , used two groups of terms in three stages. The first group was composed of: separation, margin and reagregation.
The second group contained the preliminal, liminal and post-liminal.
The first group, according to Turner (1974) (1974, p. 117) . The liminar phase, when ritualized, is expressed by a variety of symbols. Thus, "it is often compared to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness and to an eclipse of the sun or the moon" (p. 117).
In the preliminal stages of the ritual, the simplification or elimination of the social structure in the British sense and even the amplification of the structure in the sense of Levi-Strauss (Turner, 1974, p. 202) by Turner (1974) , would have the opportunity to question society itself, since its structure would be exposed "upside down." Stenros (2012, p. 9-10) states that for many authors, as Harviainen and Lieberoth, Riezler and Bateson, "the border between play and non-play is not just social, but has also a strong psychological element in attention to shared intentionality" which we will discuss now.
THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE
Michael Apter (1991 apud Stenros, 2012) works with the idea of psychological bubble, a kind of small and manageable private world that temporarily becomes immune to the outside world. Although it might be a world that can be shared, the sense that it provides is of an enchanted place, protected and free from threats. Being a psychological state, sometimes a physical representation gives it a frame, such as the outside lines of a soccer field, the computer screen or the controls of a video game console (Murray, 2003) . In other situations, words have the strength of acts (Austin, 1990) as in fairy tales with "Once upon a time ..." (Bettelheim, 1980) . Moreover, the rules of the game work as idealistic builders of that other reality.
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi does not see games as the sole possessors of flux. For him (Stenros, 2012 ) flow can occur not just fun and games, but also at work. In Hamlet on the Holodeck, Murray also uses the term "transitional objects"
taken from Winnicott (1975) , to refer to the characters and events as "real" supports of what the player projects from inside. For Winnicott (1975) , these objects are transitional because they are situated on the border between external reality and our own minds, offering us the security of an object outside ourselves upon which we can project our feelings. So are toys, so are games and video games.
In this perspective, the games, thought of as an object governed by the magic circle -while defining material or imaginary and magical space (prefer this to the sacred) in which differences between participants are abolished -for more than becoming part of everyday life to represent and influence, maintain the status of "non-serious activity" 19 , as a necessary freedom in the face of rigid social structures whenever required by civilization.
However, despite the psychological experience of a protective bubble that enables us to live -like in a rite of passage -a transitory moment, the game experience does not pass without consequences to everyday life.
As the experience of the dream, to some extent, invades our life awake, and our life awake is material that has manifestations in our dreams (Freud, 1981) , games also permeate these two sides of a same structure. When we think of the designer, games are at the same time, social expression immersed in a more or less universal context and are the expression of a particular mindset.
When we think of a player, at the same time that a game expresses a particular idea or proposes an experiment, it is also reorganized from the point of view of the player, who obtains his specific and particular experience with it 20 .
At this point, we can already perceive that the psychological formulations, 19 The idea of the game as a non-serious activity appears in Huizinga when he says that "play is diametrically opposed to the seriousness" (p. 8), it provides, often laughter, although he also states that "the contrast between play and seriousness is not decisive nor immutable "(p. 8), because we usually take seriously the games we play. Finally, he says that "there is no room for any distinction between play and seriousness" (p. 161). In the context of the expression in our sentence, the meaning is supported on the first of these perspectives. 20 The experience of each player towards certain games have shown to be so particular in our research, that it is similar to the experience with regular artwork, despite the consecration of some titles in the gaming market.
THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE
When we think games from an empirical point of view, we find the intersection between the personal and the social, as games require rules -although they can be personal -these are generally socially shared. However, for the game to be possible, all participants must accept the rules. That is a personal choice. period, the characteristics of the ritual subject are ambiguous". They are in a cultural domain "that has little or almost none of the attributes of the past or the future" (Turner, 1974, p. 116-117) . In this sense, the magic circle is a condition of ritual and liminal (phenomenon, object or subject) will function, respectively, as an event in a time or space of a subject in transition.
According to Stenros (2012) , the idea that sports and games are safe is deeply rooted in the field of game studies and especially in game design. This idea leads us to think of games as separate from everyday life, and the actions performed in them have little or no consequences beyond the game session.
Malaby (2007, p. 110) , for example, considered games as artifacts, to emphasize that they are not only produced, but also are socially constructed to be apart (in varying degrees) from everyday life. However, from an empirical point of view, some games test those limits. Not only RPGs, as we already 21 The danger in the context of this argument relates to what anthropologist Victor Turner called social anti-structure, a moment in which social structures are suspended and are questioned.
mentioned, but also the so-called pervasive games with their faint and expanded borders (Andrade, 2012) .
In a more contemporary anthropological reading, Da Matta (2000) Heidegger and Peirce, we defended in our thesis (Petry, 2010a) , that risk is an element that is present and vigorous in the generation and production of new knowledge.
In a Nietzschean reading, we would say that one needs Dionysus -the liberation from desire and will -for a new process to come into action, but would also need Apollo -the order of a form -so that another possibility might become present. The desire or impulse leads to the search of disruption from What we understand that Da Matta wants to criticize in Turner and Van Gennep is the motivation of the rite as a manifestation of opposition to the fixity of social structure: maybe society cannot in fact be so rigid, nor the rite only involve contestation, since it aims to restore the previous situation. For him, that would indeed be central to the rite is also described in anthropological observations by Van Gennep to Turner, is the separation of the young rookie the rest of society as a time individualizing.
23 Anti-structure, term organized by Turner (1974) as opposed to the structure, refers to the transient states in a society, which was called by Van Gennep (1909) 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The first question, given the debate initiated by game studies, would be to try to answer if magic circle would be a valid concept for understanding digital games, in which perspective it would still be valid.
Analyzing the prospects of the object under study as an arena (as space, time or product in which the game takes place), as a set of rules established in a social contract and as a psychological experience of the player, as proposed by Stenros (2012) , the understanding of magic circle, in our view, is still very useful for understanding the central features of digital games (it is a cultural artifact, it occurs in space and time, it requires shared rules). We includewhat is not considered by all but in the phenomenological perspective is indispensable -the Aesthetic experience (Gadamer, 1997) or the production of presence (Gumbrecht, 2010) , or immersion (Murray, 2003) as an element that produces the magic circle, the element that "traces the circle" (Lacan, 1998) of the magic circle. Without the player in a given state, the game will not be more than digital software. In this vision of digital games, the "magic" idea of the magic circle disappears and has nothing to say. Just to recapture: as we already discussed (Turner, 1974, p. 202) : "if liminality is considered as a time and a place of retreat from the normal modes of social action, it can be seen potentially as a period of examination of the core values and axioms of the culture in which it occurs", but it can also be seen as a potential time for the "liminal subject" to examine himself.
In modern societies, especially with the increasing complexity in the social division of labor and the increasing specialization of society and culture, what was in tribal society a set of transitory qualities between states became an institutionalized state. With this, liminality proved prone to enter the structure and receive a supplement of roles and structural positions (Turner, 1974) , for example, in the institutionalization of adolescence. With this would we, therefore, have lost the characteristic of "life in suspension" of liminality?
Or was it the other way around: with the uncertainties of contemporary society, in which living in transitional states became something permanent, such as the current situation of unemployment among young people (Canclini et al., 2012) , do we have just a constant "life in suspension"? And with the expansion of digital game genres that blend online and offline life, in which we are living in the reality of everyday life (for instance, selling avatars in World of Warcraft) and in the reality of the game (conquering items and overcoming challenges), are we constantly in and out of the magic circle?
In our view, these two realities are giving visible signs of merging, to the extent that the acceptance of digital games advance in contemporary society blurs the boundaries between work and leisure, blurs the boundaries between material and immaterial, between the physical body and synthetic one. This means we go into and out of the magic circle more often than we previously did. At every time we experience the game world within the world of life and no longer perceive ourselves living in rigid and static structures, but in constant and fluid transformation (Bauman, 2007) , in other words, in liminal states. Likewise, the world of life enters the world of the game as we carry our expectations, hopes and desires of our real lives to the game world (Consalvo, 2009 ). As Turner wrote in the preface to The Ritual Process:
The people of the forest, of the desert and tundra react to the same processes as the people of cities, of courts and markets. Revolutions and reforms can be studied by employing the same terminology that is used to study the cultural products of large and stable civilizations. If we understand that a game in the wake of the phenomenology of Heidegger and Gadamer, is only a game when it is played, we need the presence of the human subject (player), to understand a game, since it is he who puts the game in action. Thus, Lévi-Strauss is right, because the experience of the play will reveal its many interpretive possibilities.
